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It’s the Reply, Not the Comment: 
Observations About the Bierschbach and 
Bibas Proposal 
Ronald F. Wright†
Criminal justice policy in a democracy would not be legiti-
mate if it were to ignore the priorities of the voters; at the same 
time, criminal justice policy would be foolish if it were to ignore 
the wisdom of experts. The design trick is to combine the in-
sights of the public and the experts into an informed yet re-
sponsive system.  
 
As part of a larger project to find more places for popular 
views in the ordinary operations of criminal justice,1 Richard 
Bierschbach and Stephanos Bibas explore the law and institu-
tions of criminal sentencing in their article, Notice-and-
Comment Sentencing.2 Their search for ways to involve the 
public in sentencing leads to that cradle of populism, adminis-
trative law. This is an underutilized but fruitful source of ideas 
for criminal justice.3 Administrative law doctrines try to mesh 
the expertise of insiders and their technical skills with the 
practical wisdom of outsiders and their awareness of public pri-
orities and values.4
 
†  Needham Y. Gulley Professor of Criminal Law, Wake Forest Universi-
ty. I thank Emily Meazell for her insightful comments about the manuscript. 
Copyright © 2013 by Ronald F. Wright.  
  
 1. Professor Bibas recently developed a package of related ideas in THE 
MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012). The theme has also formed the ba-
sis for some of Professor Bierschbach’s previous work. See Richard A. 
Bierschbach, Allocution and the Purposes of Victim Participation Under the 
CVRA, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 44 (2006) (describing controversies arising from 
the passage of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act). 
 2. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sen-
tencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2012).  
 3. Id. at 4. 
 4. For examples of work that combines the insights from this unlikely 
pair of disciplines, see Rachel Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of 
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009); 
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The administrative process that forms the basis for the 
Bierschbach-Bibas proposal in sentencing law is known as “no-
tice-and-comment” rulemaking.5 As the name suggests, gov-
ernment rule makers must notify the public about a proposed 
rule and then accept comments from interested outsiders.6 De-
spite the name, however, the real key to this device is not the 
agency’s notice about its proposed rule, nor is it the comment 
that the agency receives. Instead, the heart of this procedural 
device is revealed in the reply that the agency must make to 
those comments. Without the reply, the comment goes no-
where. If the agency offers no serious reply to a comment, then 
the public input either makes no difference to outcomes, or 
speakers have no way of knowing when they make a differ-
ence.7
A well-functioning administrative process creates a re-
sponsive environment: that is, a set of habits and incentives 
that forces the agency to listen carefully and to respond mean-
ingfully to the comments. In some settings, judicial review cre-
ates this responsive environment. If the agency fails to reply to 
comments adequately when it issues final rules, a reviewing 
court will later invalidate the rules and force the agency to 
start over.
  
8 In other settings, agencies cultivate a responsive 
environment even when judges are not there to require a high-
quality response.9
The prospects for notice-and-comment sentencing, there-
fore, depend on whether the institutional players—acting to-
gether—can create a responsive environment. In such an envi-
ronment, a high-quality reply from a sentencing actor proves 
that the notice and the comments mattered.  
  
In this Essay, I will offer two brief observations about the 
responsive environment that might develop for sentencing in-
stitutions as they pursue notice-and-comment sentencing. 
First, institutions will likely respond differently to comments 
 
Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative 
Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657 (2011).  
 5. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 2, at 25. 
 6. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRO-
CESS § 6.4.6 (5th ed. 2008).  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. § 6.4.6b. 
 9. See David L. Markell & Emily H. Meazell, Administrative Proxies for 
Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 16–19), available at http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2127838.  
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that come from system insiders (such as prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, judges, and corrections officials) than comments that 
come from outsiders (such as crime victims and community ad-
vocacy groups). A truly responsive system will value the outsid-
er comments, even though they do not add value in the same 
way as insider comments. Outsider comments matter more for 
their collective themes and weight than for the contents of each 
comment in isolation.  
Second, the most important sentencing institutions operate 
at the state level. Consequently, a responsive environment 
must account for the high volumes and minimal staffing levels 
that are routinely present in state sentencing. The best re-
sponse to comments in a high-volume system is to draw in-
sights from the sheer quantity of comments rather than re-
sponding only to the merits of each individual comment.  
I.  CONSIDER THE SOURCE OF THE COMMENT   
Regulatory agencies receive comments during the rulemak-
ing process both from insiders and outsiders.10 The insiders in-
clude trade associations within the industry targeted for a po-
tential new regulation (say, automobile manufacturers), along 
with organizations that might benefit from the regulation (for 
instance, auto insurance companies that would pay fewer 
claims from policyholders who drive safer cars).11 The repeat 
players in the commenting process also include organizations 
that represent more dispersed groups of regulatory targets or 
beneficiaries (consumer groups or business “roundtable” con-
federations).12
On the other hand, outsider commenters are not repeat 
players. They could simply be individuals—anyone at all, for 
there is no limit on the parties who have the right to submit 




 10. See Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Pro-
cess: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
THEORY 245, 247–48 (1998). 
  
 11. See, e.g., id. at 252–54 (noting that for the eight examined National 
Highway Traffic Safety proposed rules, “between 66.7 percent and 100 percent 
of the comments were submitted by corporations, public utilities, or trade as-
sociations” and not “a single comment [was] from an individual citizen”). 
 12. See Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agen-
cy Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 
1781–87 (2012) (discussing different impacts of repeat players and other 
groups during the rulemaking process).  
 13. The rulemaking process in Europe historically has relied less on com-
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The comments from insiders and outsiders are quite differ-
ent. Insiders often hire attorneys to draft their comments about 
proposed rules, and they typically offer technical information 
about the costs and benefits of the proposed regulatory method, 
along with alternatives to that method.14 These savvy com-
menters acquaint the regulators with normal operating proce-
dures in the industry. Insiders (and their lawyers) also tend to 
include legal arguments about potential limits on the agency’s 
authority to pursue certain solutions.15
As for outsider comments, many tend to register prefer-
ences—in effect, casting a vote for or against the rule.
  
16 In some 
cases, these comments result from grassroots campaigns by or-
ganizations. One such organization, the Sierra Club, places 
form letters in the hands of their members, urging them to 
send a pre-packaged statement to the agency as a comment on 
the proposed rule.17 In other cases, the outsider commenter 
might tell a story that connects the rule to a real-world exam-
ple of the harm that flows from unregulated conduct, or the 
concrete costs that might flow from a new regulation.18 In addi-
tion, outsider comments tend to link the agency’s choice to 
larger themes about government regulation and corporate re-
sponsibility.19
 
ments from groups without a direct financial interest in the subject of the rule. 
See JOANA MENDES, PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN UNION RULEMAKING: A 
RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH 36–43 (2011).  
 Although lawyers do not guide these commenters 
and they often lack technical knowledge, they do address ques-
 14. See David C. Nixon et al., With Friends Like These: Rule-Making 
Comment Submissions to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 59, 63 (2002). 
 15. See, e.g., Christopher Jewell & Lisa Bero, Public Participation and 
Claimsmaking: Evidence Utilization and Divergent Policy Frames in Califor-
nia’s Ergonomics Rulemaking, 17 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 625, 626–27 
(2007). 
 16. See, e.g., Wolf Management, MINN. DEPARTMENT NAT. RESOURCES, 
http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/mammals/wolves/mgmt.html (last visited Apr. 23, 
2013) (follow “Survey Results” hyperlink) (stating that seventy-nine percent of 
commenters opposed wolf hunting while twenty-one percent were in support). 
 17. See, e.g., Sample Form Letter 5, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, http:// 
www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23808/SAMPLE_FORM_LETTER_5-Sierra_Club_ 
22543_Member_Letters.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). I place these com-
ments in the “outsider” category because the content does not stress technical 
information and it originates from a concerned individual.  
 18. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 451–52, 453 (2005). 
 19. Id. at 443. 
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tions that are relevant for the rulemaking agency.20 Indeed, 
they expand the range of topics for the agency to consider.21
Agencies know very well how to respond to insider com-
ments. They identify claims about the potential benefits of a 
rule, placing those facts and predictions into the context of cur-
rent scientific knowledge, with all of its uncertainties.
  
22 They 
remain alert for new information about potential costs of the 
rule, and predict the size and distribution of such costs.23 And 
finally, the agencies create tailored responses to the merits of 
each important comment.24
The rulemaking agency faces more of a puzzle in how to re-
spond to outsider comments. The agency might count the 
“votes” involved when form letters endorse a particular argu-
ment about the proposed rule, reporting the vote tally as one 
indication of the breadth of support for a viewpoint.
  
25 Some 
agencies rely on contractors to analyze and aggregate the 
themes that appear most frequently in those comments, using 
data analysis techniques common to the e-discovery field.26
Agencies have also begun to explore various “e-
rulemaking” techniques of advertising and framing their pro-
posed rules.
  
27 Such techniques are designed to enable ordinary 
citizens to participate in ways that are more relevant to the 
agency, despite the commenters’ lack of technical expertise or 
awareness of the regulatory context.28 Similarly, outsiders ben-
efit from the annual “Unified Regulatory Agenda” that each 
federal agency publishes to describe its current regulatory 
timetable and priorities: it can help outsiders understand how 
their comments fit into current conversations at the agency.29
 
 20. Id. at 452. 
  
 21. Id. at 449–52.  
 22. See id. at 463–64. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 459. 
 25. See Mortgage Assets Affected by PACE Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 3958, 
3958–64 (Jan. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1254).  
 26. See Alice Lipowicz, Conference to Advise Agencies on E-Rulemaking, 
FCW.COM (June 13, 2011), http://fcw.com/articles/2011/06/13/administrative 
-conference-advising-agencies-on-erulemaking-this-week.aspx.  
 27. See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: 
Social Networking and Participation in Online Rulemaking, 31 PACE L. REV. 
382, 383 (2011). 
 28. See id. at 386; Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 395, 402–03 (2011).  
 29. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 642 (1993), reprinted as amend-
ed in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 
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When it comes to the notice-and-comment sentencing that 
Bierschbach and Bibas propose, a similar divide is likely to ap-
pear in agency responses to insider and outsider comments. 
The easier questions arise in connection with insiders. Sentenc-
ing judges at the retail level and sentencing policy makers at 
the wholesale level could learn a great deal from insider com-
ments coming from criminal justice professionals.  
This does not mean that sentencing systems necessarily 
make room for such valuable input. One of the signal shortcom-
ings of the U.S. Sentencing Commission was its failure to in-
corporate into the sentencing guidelines the insights available 
from system experts other than prosecutors.30 By putting so 
much energy into stamping out “noncompliance” among sen-
tencing judges, rather than creating a receptive environment 
for judicial insights, the Commission missed some crucial op-
portunities in its early decades.31
The same could be said of the insider insights of defense 
attorneys, state corrections experts, state sentencing commis-
sions, criminologists, and numerous other groups with valuable 
inside information about criminal investigation, adjudication, 
and punishment. While the U.S. Sentencing Commission re-
ceived sporadic comments from those groups, there was no pro-
spect of judicial review to force the Commission to engage those 
comments seriously.
  
32 Nor was there any other force at work to 
create the sort of responsive environment that many other reg-
ulatory agencies achieve.33
State sentencing commissions have sometimes built a more 
responsive environment for system insiders. The most success-
ful commissions at the state level drew their members from all 





 At the wholesale level of 
 30. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
1631, 1663 (2012); Marc Miller & Ronald Wright, Your Cheatin’ Heart(land): 
The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
723, 756–60 (1999) (noting that the Commission claimed to mirror past sen-
tencing practices rather than consulting system insiders for input on prescrip-
tive guidelines).  
 31. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 30, at 1646–57. 
 32. See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administra-
tive Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1, 
13–15, 41–42 (1991). 
 33. Id. at 13–14. 
 34. See Rachel Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 772 
(2005) [hereinafter Barkow, Administering Crime]; Rachel Barkow, Sentencing 
Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 
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guideline policy formation, the commissions in many states not 
only gave notice about their proposals and received comments, 
but they also replied to insider comments in a meaningful 
way.35 Both the initial state sentencing guidelines and the 
amendments to those guidelines over the years reflected the 
experience of insider criminal justice experts, largely because 
the commission members included representatives of those ac-
tors.36
The record is weaker for outsider comments at the state 
level. In a few states, representatives of crime victims, groups 
advocating rehabilitation programs, and business groups held 
seats on the sentencing commission, but they tended to be pas-
sive players in the writing of guidelines.
  
37 As for outsider com-
ments at the retail level of individual sentences, the opportuni-
ty for crime victims to speak is limited and other outsider 
viewpoints simply have no practical point of entry at sentenc-
ing.38
In sum, the sentencing actors who receive comments—
whether at the wholesale policy level or the retail case outcome 
level—will likely respond differently to comments, depending 
on whether they come from insiders or outsiders. Insider com-
menters speak the language of the sentencing agencies; that is, 
they invoke the types of issues and the categories of evidence 
that usually drive the discussion of sentencing policy or case 
outcomes. As a result, insiders who submit comments can ex-
pect over time to hear meaningful responses from sentencing 
actors.  
  
On the other hand, comments from outsiders (precisely 
those who most interest Bierschbach and Bibas) will generate 
little meaningful response if they are subjected to the same 
protocols as the insider comments. Other regulatory agencies 
have developed specialized methods to promote useful com-
ments from outsiders and to find meaning in their comments, 
primarily by analyzing those statements in the aggregate ra-
ther than individually. Sentencing agencies must do the same if 
 
1613–19 (2012).  
 35. Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 34, at 773. 
 36. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consen-
sus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1197–98, 1218–
19 (2005).  
 37. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 164-37 (2011).  
 38. Edna Erez, Victim Participation in Sentencing: Rhetoric and Reality, 
18 J. CRIM. JUST. 19, 20 (1990). 
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they are to create a responsive environment for outsider com-
ments.  
II.  CONSIDER THE CAPACITY FOR A REPLY IN HIGH-
VOLUME STATE SYSTEMS   
A second relevant feature of the agency’s reply builds on 
this observation: most sentencing authorities operate at the 
state rather than the federal level. As a result, most of the 
agencies’ practices will develop within a state-specific adminis-
trative practice. The state system backdrop for sentencing mat-
ters in at least two ways: the local norms for administrative re-
view and the high volume of state systems.  
I begin with norms of review. Any administrative lawyer 
who is asked about the intensity or effectiveness of administra-
tive review by judges will respond with more questions. Which 
agency is being reviewed? Which circuit court is performing the 
review? What category of agency action is receiving the scruti-
ny? While the formal standard of review for the court has sur-
prisingly little impact,39
Ultimately, this context for review will drive the quality of 
the agency’s reply. Strong external accountability in the rule-
making context leads agencies to respond more substantively 
and thoroughly to comments from the public; weaker norms of 
external review will sometimes lead to less responsive agen-
cies.
 the expectations for external review of 
agency action takes on a local flavor.  
40
The intensity of review that an agency can expect may dif-
fer from state to state. In some states, the courts have no power 
to review the rationality of agency rules and therefore have 
limited power to test the quality of an agency’s replies to public 
comments.
  
41 In other states, judicial review of agency action is 
every bit as vigorous (and varied) as one finds in the federal 
system.42
 
 39. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 155 
(2010). 
 
 40. Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Ap-
proach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-
Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1388 (2011). 
 41. See William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rule-
making, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 147, 147 (1991); Jim Rossi, Politics, Institutions, 
and Administrative Procedure: What Exactly Do We Know from the Empirical 
Study of State Level APAs, and What More Can We Learn?, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 
961, 974 (2006). 
 42. Funk, supra note 41, at 153–56. 
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Just as the external review norms can vary, the same is 
true of the internal cultures of different agencies. Some agen-
cies deal with regulatory topics or operate within an organiza-
tional or political structure that coaxes them toward respon-
sive, high-quality outcomes, even without close monitoring 
from judges.43 Other agencies are just the opposite.44
A second feature of the sentencing actor’s institutional set-
ting matters even more to the quality of the reply: the high vol-
ume of cases that flow through state criminal justice systems. 
Most of the sentencing policy choices and sentencing case out-
comes in the United States happen under state law.
 This varie-
ty of review contexts probably means that Bierschbach and 
Bibas’s notice-and-comment sentencing would have markedly 
different impact from place to place.  
45 State 
courts rather than federal courts sentence over ninety percent 
of all felons each year, and over ninety-nine percent of the mis-
demeanants.46 While the federal system processes about as 
many felony cases as some of the larger single-state systems, 
the state courts collectively overwhelm the federal courts in 
volume.47
Moreover, the resources devoted to each case in the state 
system are much lower than what the federal system employs.
  
48 
The state systems are larger both in raw output and in case-
loads for judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation offic-
ers, and other actors.49
 
 43. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Adminis-
trative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 577, 585–89 (2011). 
 The staff levels at the policy institutions 
 44. See id. The parole boards in some states have developed a track record 
for minimal judicial review of individual outcomes, and minimal external re-
view of any guidelines or standards that they adopt. See, e.g., Timothy P. Wile, 
Contributions of the Commonwealth Court to the Field of Probation and Pa-
role, 21 WIDENER L.J. 77, 80–81 (2011). In jurisdictions where this holds true 
for parole practices, other sentencing actors might expect the tradition of def-
erence to carry over into their work.  
 45. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE 
COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 1–2 (last updated Nov. 22, 2010), availa-
ble at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See id. at 2. 
 48. Judith Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial 
Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism: The Childress Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 917, 973 (2012). 
 49. Compare U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL CASES 
COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING (INCLUDING TRANSFERS) DURING 
THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MARCH 31, 2010 AND 2011 (2011), available 
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of the state systems, such as the sentencing commissions, are 
smaller than their federal counterparts.50
Finally, the state criminal systems spend a larger percent-
age of the total budgets in their jurisdictions than one finds 
with the federal budget.
  
51
The large volumes and tight budgets of the state systems 
have important implications for the capacity of sentencing ac-
tors to reply meaningfully to any comments from the public. 
Case-level comments directed to busy sentencing judges in the 
state courts would likely have less impact than comments di-
rected to federal sentencing judges. A state sentencing judge 
would be hard pressed to reply meaningfully to comments at 
the case level. Similarly, while Bierschbach and Bibas’s vision 
of a probation officer who moderates an online discussion to in-
form the sentencing in a particular case
 The larger fiscal impact at the state 
level affects the type of arguments that sentencing actors will 
find persuasive, because spending constraints carry more 
weight at the state level.  
52
At the level of policy, the guidelines themselves reflect the 
different needs of state actors. Where the federal guidelines 
(occupying hundreds of printed pages) require intricate fact-
finding to make specified adjustments to “base level” starting 
points, the state guidelines (typically embodied in about a doz-
en pages of text) leave room for more flexible adjustments to 
the presumptive sentence for the particular crime of conviction. 
 sounds challenging 
but plausible in the federal context, the idea would produce on-
ly laughs in the state context.  
 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/ 
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2011/tables/D00CMar11.pdf, with State 
Court Caseload Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index 
.cfm?ty=tp&tid=30 (last updated Jan. 23, 2012). Note that 54% of the more 
than 100 million state cases every year are due to traffic violations. 
 50. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED 
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 3, http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_ 
Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 
2013), with Commission Members and Staff, MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
COMM’N (2007), http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5/commission.htm. The 
Federal Commission has over 100 employees while Minnesota’s only has 17. 
 51. In 2006, the federal government spent only $36 billion of a $3 trillion 
budget on criminal justice, while state and local government spending com-
bined exceeded $178 billion. Matthew Robinson, How Much of the U.S. Budget 
Goes to Criminal Justice?, MEDIA COVERAGE CRIME & CRIM. JUST. (Apr. 1, 
2011), http://mediacriminaljustice.blogspot.com/2011/04/how-much-of-us 
-budget-goes-to-criminal.html. 
 52. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 2, at 48–49, 57–58.  
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It could not be otherwise, given the huge dockets in state crim-
inal courts.  
Yet there are still important insights from insider and out-
sider comments that could produce meaningful replies from 
sentencing actors, even in the torrential criminal justice sys-
tems of the states. The key idea in the state systems would be 
to stress quantity over quality. Instead of looking for ways to 
increase the depth of comments and viewpoints that attach to 
any given case, one might link the comments that happen to 
land in the files across an entire category of cases. Although the 
file for any single case might contain no comments at all, or 
unbalanced and unrepresentative comments, a collection of 
cases might offer a rich and balanced array of comments, both 
from insiders and outsiders.  
Such a body of commentary might even prompt a thought-
ful reply if the sentencing actor had some control over the mo-
ments to seek out such input. Imagine a sentencing judge who 
encounters a puzzling and unusual case, or develops concerns 
about the accepted way of resolving a typical case. The judge 
might access an information system, select parameters that 
would define the “similar” cases in the judge’s mind, and re-
ceive information about the distribution of sentences imposed 
in that case.53 At the same time, the judge could access any 
comments filed by the public, the probation officer, the attor-
neys, the original sentencing judge, corrections officials, tax-
payers, or anybody else interested in any of the cases brought 
together in the judge’s search.54
Now imagine a staffer at a state sentencing commission, 
asked to recommend possible changes to the sentencing rules 
for a particular type of case. Again, a search for all the com-
ments on file for the types of cases that the staffer deems to be 
analogous could make a difference to the staffer. The comments 
 Those outcomes and comments, 
taken together, might inform the sentence imposed in the cur-
rent case. It might also prompt the judge and other interested 
persons—insiders and outsiders—to reply to those comments, 
entering further observations into the record for possible use in 
future similar cases.  
 
 53. See Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: 
Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of 
Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (2005). The parties should have access 
to the comments that the judge consults, along with an opportunity to respond 
to those comments.  
 54. See id. at 1376–80. 
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might prompt a reply from the commission if it amends the 
rules. Where the volume of comments in the case-level data-
base becomes large, the policymaker could resort to the tech-
niques that other regulatory agencies use to identify themes 
and trends in large numbers of submissions.  
The very fact that judges enter a non-standard sentence in 
a category of cases at an above-average rate could itself func-
tion as a type of comment. This pattern in the outcomes might 
reflect the judgment that the preferred sentence is set at the 
wrong level. If all of the movement points in one direction 
(above or below the presumptive sentence), that offers some 
clue about a possible policy change.55
These pre-existing comments, when used at the wholesale 
policy level, would have the advantage of being grounded in 




Sending routine reports to sentencing actors—reports that 
summarize the number and type of comments on file for any 
given category of offense or offender—could also prove useful. 
The presence of a large number of comments within an area 
may prompt actors at the wholesale policy level to give extra 
scrutiny to that set of rules. It could convince actors at the re-
tail case level to reconsider their current practices. Because the 
reports would appear routinely without a specific request from 
a sentencing actor, they might identify blind spots for those ac-
tors. A regular practice of “auditing” the comments that accu-
mulate within particular subgroups of cases could also identify 
new areas for scrutiny.
 This context tends to produce more restrained, 
affordable, and humane judgments about proper sentences. 
57
  CONCLUSION   
  
Notice-and-comment sentencing does not necessarily en-
dorse the wisdom of crowds. Neither does it leave experts to 
their own devices. It is built, instead, on the hope that experts 
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can interact with people who care enough to participate, and 
reach better results on that basis.  
This tempered populism, as filtered through expertise, sets 
the Bierschbach-Bibas proposal apart. The academics and pro-
fessionals who work in criminal justice routinely look for ways 
to insulate criminal punishment from popular passions; they 
hope above all to take advantage of specialized professional in-
sights unsullied by popular views.  
This minimization strategy tries to keep popular influence 
over criminal justice as small as possible. The strategy, howev-
er, fails far more often than it succeeds. Sometimes it fails be-
cause the one set of insiders irresponsibly stirs public miscon-
ceptions about crime for political advantage. Sometimes it fails 
because the public simply cares too much about criminal policy 
to stay on the sidelines, regardless of the manipulative plans of 
political leaders.  
The challenge is to find those settings where public input 
can happen while retaining a sense of proportion. As a rule of 
thumb, this happens when the public understands the whole 
context for the crime and the punishment. For instance, voters 
favor more modest punishment levels when they concentrate on 
the tax revenues needed to run a massive corrections system. 
Jurors reach more nuanced judgments in particular cases as 
they learn more about the defendant’s circumstances. Commu-
nity members have more ambivalent views about punishment 
when they live in the same neighborhood where the wrongdoers 
live and where they inflict their harms.  
This sense of context can be built. Sentencing actors who 
notify the public about their plans for policy and for case out-
comes, and then accept comments from the public, can learn 
what the people understand (or do not understand) about sen-
tencing context. The insiders themselves can learn more from 
these comments about the sentencing context, and improve 
their choices accordingly. But it is the reasoned reply to the 
comments that allows sentencing actors to deepen the public’s 
sense of context about sentencing. A quality reply from sentenc-
ing insiders leads to greater public trust in a transparent and 
responsive system. I share with Professors Bierschbach and 
Bibas an optimistic view: a sense of context will improve the 
common sense of criminal sentencing.  
 
